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Anchoring Stabilization Clauses in International
Petroleum Contracts
J. NNA EMEKA*

Abstract
Periods of high gas prices, as recently witnessed, herald repudiation of internationalpetroleum
contractsas host governments seek a greatershare of the profits under various legitimate andflimsy
theories, raising the question of the utility of stabilization clauses in such agreements.
Stabilization clauses were introduced to reduce political risk and preserve the fiscal regime in
internationalpetroleum contracts. While practitionersand clients derive comfort from stabilization clauses based largely on internationalarbitrationsprecedents, this article notes that such comfore may be misplaced absent the requisite internationalanchor, which could be missing in
internationalpetroleum, and accordingly stresses the need for such anchor,proposes drafting, client
management, and litigationsconsiderationsfor the practitioner.

I.

Introduction

The popularity of the stabilization clause as a risk-management tool can create a false
sense of security and undermine a party's ability to timely initiate negotiations and explore
dispute resolution alternatives when faced with a governmental measure that alters the
fiscal landscape. What is insufficiently stressed in many publications trumpeting the benefits of the stabilization clause is that its apparent effectiveness and validation by arbitration tribunals is contextual and rooted in an international anchor in the arbitration clause.
An international anchor postulates arbitral venue outside the host county, even if the host
country's law governed, and/or stipulates that the governing law be the law of another
nation with a developed judicial system, rather than that of the host nation, or provides a
treaty protection. Absent an international anchor, the stabilization clause provides little
more than psychological comfort, as the wronged party must litigate in the host nation
with the attendant perils.
This article provides a brief historical context of stabilization clauses, their origin, and
purpose; explores arbitral decisions and their import; and underlines the need to position
the stabilization clause within the framework of the arbitration clause and other provi* J. Nna Emeka; J.D. Loyola School of Law; B.A., M.A., M.P.S., Loyola University, New Orleans, LA.
The author is in private practice, and the views reflected in this article are solely his.
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sions, such as the governing law. Critically, the arbitration clause should provide the requisite international anchor; otherwise, counsel should consider other options to
internationalize the agreement.
Given divergent international arbitral rulings on whether a State entity, such as a national oil company (NOC), is an agent of the State and whether its actions are attributable
to the State, this article suggests that, to the extent practical, the State should become a
party for the limited purpose of stabilization, rendering issues of agency and estoppelwhich are often relied on absent a direct contractual privity with the state-superfluous.
When internationalizing the clause contractually in the arbitration clause, particularly
through the governing law or place of arbitration, counsel should explore internationalizing by treaty.

II.

Rationale for Stabilization Clauses in Production Sharing Agreements

By the time an international oil company (IOC) invests in a resource rich nation, it has
conducted significant due diligence to review the fiscal, tax, and legal regimes in the host
nation, as much as the geologic and geophysical data. It is well aware of the risks in
exploring and exploiting oil and gas resources. The currently available commercial and
legal regime informs the IOC's fiscal model and the potential profitability of its massive,
capital intensive, high-risk, long-term investment, which could run into billions' and span
decades yet will not yield any returns for years. Once the investment is made, the IOC
cannot pull out when a dispute arises, given the scale of its committed resources; it is
2
essentially at the mercy of the host nation.
Host nations richly endowed with mineral resources, on the other hand, tend to be
developing economies, often beset with political and economic crises and potentially laden
with a history of coups and counter-coups. They dangle fiscal incentives to attract the
IOCs to provide needed capital, expertise, and management required for successful ex3
ploitation of their mineral resources.
The structure of the relationship has evolved over time: from concession agreements in
the early years, when title to oil and gas was conveyed to IOCs for forty to sixty years or
more, with the host country retaining a royalty interest, to the current production sharing
agreements in which the State or a State entity-a NOC tasked with stewardship, and
sometimes regulation, of the country's mineral resources-retains title to the mineral resources and engages the IOC as a "contractor" to explore and produce oil and gas on its
1. The Shell-operated Bonga platform off the coast of Nigeria is estimated at $3.6 billion. See Rigzone.
corn, Shell's Bonga Field Begins Offshore Nigeria, http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a-id=27260
(last visited Jan. 15, 2009); Chevron's Frade project off the coast of Brazil is estimated at $3 billion. See
Russell Gold, Chevron Project Offers Glimpse of Oil's Future, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Oct. 30, 2008, http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB 122531663876381697.html?mod=dist smartbrief.
2. Margarita T.B. Coale, Stabilization Clauses in InternationalPetroleum Transactions, 30 DENV. J. INT'L L.
& PoL'y 217, 220 (2002). See also Thomas W. Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing Internationallnvestment
Commitments: InternationalLaw Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEx. LNT'L LJ. 216, 220 (1996).
3. MARTIN M. OLISA, NIGERIAN PETROLEUM LAW AND PRACTICE 191-92 (2d ed. 1997). He observes
that when oil exploration and productionactivities slowed down in Nigeria in the 1960s and 70s, owing to high tax and
royalty rates, the Nigerian government introduceda new tax and royalty regime to encourage exploration and production, boosting profit margins. Id.
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behalf. 4 The IOC essentially bears all the risks as the NOC is mostly a carried interest but
is rewarded with a share of the profits.5 The NOC's share of profits and the bonuses,
taxes and royalties paid to the State can result in up to, and sometimes more than, a 90
percent take for the State. 6 The long duration of these contracts makes them susceptible
to political or economic influences unforeseeable when the contract was concluded, but
7
with adverse impact on the economics of the contract.
Against this backdrop, an IOC expectedly seeks reassurance that the host nation shares
its belief in the sanctity of contracts: that the fiscal incentives offered and promises made
will outlive the contracting political leaders and last for the duration of the production
sharing agreement-hence, the need for a stabilization clause in the production sharing
agreement." Host nations (which are mostly developing nations) usually agree to this
clause to reassure IOCs and encourage investment and development of their mineral resources. It is obvious that without such assurance, the IOC remains at the mercy of the
host government once the investment is made, 9 and nothing precludes the host government from exploiting the shift in bargaining power and seeking favorably to renegotiate
the agreement under some legitimate or flimsy legal concept.' 0
A.

ORIGIN OF STABILIZATION CLAUSES

One commentator has traced the origin of stabilization clauses to "the period between
World War I and World War II when U.S. companies began to include them in concessionary contracts because of Latin American nationalizations ... to preserve concessions
for the full term of the contract."" While stabilization clauses were robustly debated in
the 1970s and 1980s' 2 , their utility and future remain fertile grounds for discussion today,
as "stability of the terms underlying the decision to commit risk capital or those agreed
3
upon [remains] the constant theme of international petroleum investment."'
Debate over the nature and application of stabilization clauses remain relevant, with the
cycle of soaring oil and gas prices accompanied by host governments' repudiation of fiscal
regimes in production sharing agreements and increasing resource nationalization as
demonstrated by the following. In Russia, the government of Vladimir Putin acquired
4
Gazprom and revoked a permit for a Shell oil and gas project.1 In Chad, the government
4. R. Doak Bishop, International Arbitration of Petroleum Disputes: The Development of a Lex Petrolea,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION INTrERNATIONAL ENERGY AND MINERALS ARBITRATION
MINERAL LAW SERIEs 2-18, 18 (2002).

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Klaus Peter Bergen, Renegotiation and Adaptation of InternationalInvestment Contracts: The Role of Contract Draftersand Arbitrator, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1347, 1348 (2004).
8. The production agreement may be termed a "production sharing contract" (PSC) or a "production
sharing agreement" (PSA), but the two retain the same features and have little real distinction.

9. Lorenzo Cotula, Reconciling Regulatory Stability and Evolution of Environmental Standards in Investment
Contracts: Towards a Rethink of Stabilization Clauses, I J. WORLD ENERGY L. & Bus. 158 (2008).
10. Waelde & Ndi, smpra note 2, at 225.
11. Bishop, supra note 4, at 23.

12. Waelde & Ndi, supra note 2, at 216.
13. Thomas W. Waelde, InternationalEnergy Investment, 17 ENERGY L.J. 191, 214 (1996).
14. Alexia Brunet & Juan Agustin Lentine, Arbitration of InternationalOil, Gas, and Energy Disputes in Latin
America, 27 Nw. J. INT' L L. & Bus. 591, 622 (2007).
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demanded that international operators Chevron, Exxon Mobil, and Petronas renegotiate
their revenue share. 15 In Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez took control over the formerly independent Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) 16 and ordered the IOCs to turn
over their majority interest to PDVSA or face complete nationalization of their interests
in the oil-rich Orinoco River Basin, forcing out ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips. In Bolivia, President Evo Moralez mobilized the army into Bolivian gas fields and nationalized
Bolivia's industry.17 In Ecuador, the government assumed control of the holdings of the
U.S. oil company Occidental,1s and in Nigeria, the government's attempts to renegotiate
PSCs concluded in the 1990s.19

The apparent perception that IOCs have reaped a windfall in the climate of high energy
prices and unfairly benefited from the production sharing agreement seems to undergird
these efforts, exacerbated by poverty, political ideology, corruption, restive constituent
groups, and dismal economic conditions in some of the host countries. 20 Thus, a consequence of high prices is that "producer governments looked at the terms offered in the
1990s and in many cases concluded they had been overly generous. The obsolescing bargain was alive and well, and fueled pressures on the IOCs." 21 Forgotten amidst the clawback by the host nations is the colossal risk undertaken by the IOCs in exploring new
frontiers, the risks of a dry hole and unrecoverable, massive costs, not to mention the high
volatility in the oil prices as shown recently by the crude oil prices soaring to $147 per
barrel in July 2008 and falling to $55 per barrel in November 2008.22
B.

DEFINITION AND FEATURES OF STABILIZATION CLAUSES

Stabilization clauses have been described as an effort to protect the private investor by
"restricting the legislative or administrative power of the State, as sovereign in its country
and legislator in its own legal system, to amend the contractual regulation or even to annul
the agreement" 23 and are negotiated with the State or a State entity entrusted with administering petroleum resources in the public interest. 24 Guaranteeing the stability of key
conditions of the agreement that bear on the return to the investment, such as the fiscal
regime, is the goal.2 5 Hence, stabilization clauses are considered a bulwark against future
changes in law or regulation as the host government contracts away its sovereign right to
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. SeeIHS.com, Nigeria Floats the Idea of Renegotiating Contracts, http://energy.ihs.com/News/WWNews/news-2007/Nigeria-floats-the-idea-of-renegotiating-contracts.htm. (last visited Feb. 4, 2009) (citing 23
INFERNATIONAL OIL LE=YER 43 (2007)).
20. See Waelde & Ndi, snpra note 2, at 226.
21. Paul Stevens, National Oil Companies and International Oil Companies in the Middle East: Under the
Shadow of Government and the Resource Nationalism Cycle, I J. WORLD ENERGY L. & Bus. 23 (2008).
22. See New York Mercantile Exchange Homepage, http://www.nymex.com/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 4,
2009).
23. Piero Bernadini, Stabilizationand Adaptation in Oil and Gas Investments, 1 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & Bus.
100 (2008).
24. See id. at 98; see also Waelde & Ndi, supra note 2, at 218 (observing that recent stabilization clauses have
been negotiated with state entities rather than with the State).
25. Bemadini, supra note 23, at 100.
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later introduce laws in derogation of those existing when the contract with an IOC was
consummated.
Commentators distinguish stabilization clauses into two key categories: (1) traditional
freezing clauses that provide that the law in effect when the contract was executed governs
the contract and bars the host government from later enacting any law inconsistent with
the contract, 26 and (2) modern hybrid-stabilization clauses with adaptation mechanisms
where the state undertakes to compensate an IOC should subsequent legislation increase
its financial burden.27 Examples of the former traditional clause include:
1. The 1968 Production Sharing Contract between Pertamina and Agip SpA, which
provided in art. XVI.i.2 that "[t]his contract shall not be annulled, amended or modi28
fied in any respect except by the mutual consent in writing of the Parties hereto;"
and
2. Article 25 of the 1937 concession agreement between Petroleum Concessions,
Ltd. and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, providing that:
The Sultan shall not by general or special legislation or by administrative measures or
by any act whatever annul this Agreement ... No alterations shall be made in the
terms of this Agreement . . . except in the event of the Sultan and the Company
jointly agreeing that it is desirable in the interest of both parties to make certain
alterations ....

29

In the modern, hybrid stabilization clause prevalent in recent agreements, governmental
intervention triggers an adaption of the agreement to restore the agreement to its original
equilibrium; thus, upon disruption of the status quo, the parties are obliged to negotiate in
good faith to restore the original balance. 30 Only if they fail to reach an agreement can
31
the matter be referred to arbitration.
The hybrid-stabilization clause (which is the focus of this article as the freezing species
is hardly in vogue, except in older agreements) generally contains the following four principal features, as illustrated by the samples shown in section I below:
1. They define a change of circumstance that will trigger renegotiation, which can
be defined in general or specific economic terms;
2. They indicate the effect of the change on the contract;
3. They outline the objective and procedure of the renegotiation; and
4.

They provide for a solution if renegotiation fails.

32

26. Waelde & Ndi, supra note 2, at 260.
27. Id. at 264.
28. Bernardini, supra note 23, at 100, n. 9.
29. Cited in ERNEST E. SMITIJOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, OWEN L. ANDERSON, GARY B. CONINF,JOHN S.
LowE, & BRUCE M. KRAMER, INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS 414 (2d ed. 2000).
30. See Bernadini, supra note 23, at 102-103.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 103. He further observes that an implicit, common feature of the hybrid-stabilization clauses is
that the triggering event for renegotiation not be within the control of the party invoking it. Id.
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Sample (Hybrid) Stabilization Clauses
ART.

34.12

(EQUILIBRIUM OF THE AGREEMENT) OF THE QATAR MODEL

EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENT OF

1994:

Whereas the financial position of the Contractor has been based, under the agreement, on the laws and regulations in force at the Effective Date, it is agreed that, if
any future law, decree or regulation affects Contractor's financial position, and in
particular if the customs duties exceed . . . percent during the term of the Agreement,
both Parties shall enter into negotiations, in good faith, in order to reach an equitable
solution that maintains the economic equilibrium of this Agreement.
Failing to reach agreement on such equitable solution, the matter may be referred by
either party to arbitration pursuant to art. 31.33

B.

CLAUSE

26

("REVIEw/RE-NEGOTIATION

OF CONTRACT AND FISCAL TERMS") OF

THE NIGERIA/SAO TOME & PRINCIPE JOINT DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
MODEL PRODUCTION SHARING CONTRACT OF

2004:

26.1 The Parties agree that the commercial terms and conditions of this contract
are based on the existing fiscal terms in accordance with the provisions of the Petroleum Regulations dated the 4th of April, 2003. If such fiscal terms are changed, the
Parties agree subject to Clause 26.3, to review the terms and conditions of this contract affected by such changes to align such terms and conditions with the fiscal
terms.

26.2 The terms of this contract have been negotiated and agreed having due regard
to the terms of the Tax Regulations dated the 4th of April, 2003.
26.3 If at any time or from time to time, there is a change in legislation or regulations which materially affect the commercial benefit afforded the Contractor under
this Contract, the parties will consult each other and shall agree to such amendments
to this contract as are necessary to restore as near as practicable such commercial
34
benefits which existed under the contract as of []the effective date.
The clear import of these stabilization clauses, as can be seen from the first and third
paragraphs above, is equilibrium restoration: a return to the IOC's economic expectations
when the contract was executed. Nonetheless, they could be improved by providing a
time limit for renegotiation and what should trigger referral to arbitration.

33. Id. at 102.
34. Nigeria/Sao Tome & Principe, JoINr DEVELOPMENT Au-moRrrY MODEL PRODUCTION SHARING

CoNrRCT OF 2004, cl.
26, available at http://web.austin.utexas.edu/chenry/oil/2006/PSA2004model/iNSTJDA%20Model%20PSC%202004.pdf. (Referral to arbitration is provided in Clause 24, "CONCILIATION
AND ARBITRATION" of the Production Sharing Contract.).
VOL. 42, NO. 4
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THE KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ MODEL PRODUCTION

SHARING CoNTRACT: FIscAL STABILrTY

43.2 The obligations of the CONTRACTOR resulting from this Contract shall
not be aggravated by the GOVERNMENT and the general and overall equilibrium
between the Parties under this Contract shall not be affected in a substantial and
lasting manner.
43.3 The GOVERNMENT guarantees to the CONTRACTOR for the entire duration of this Contract, that it will maintain the stability of the fiscal and economic
conditions of this Contract, as they result from this Contract and as they result from
the laws and regulations in force on the date of signature of this Contract. The
CONTRACTOR has entered into this Contract on the basis of the legal, fiscal and
economic framework prevailing at the Effective Date. If, at any time after the Effective Date, there is any change in the legal, fiscal and/or economic framework under
the Kurdistan Region Law or other law applicable in the Kurdistan Region which
detrimentally affects the CONTRACTOR, the terms and conditions of the Contract
shall be altered so as to restore the CONTRACTOR to the same overall economic
position as that which CONTRACTOR would have been in, had no such change in
the legal, fiscal and/or economic framework occurred.
43.4 If the CONTRACTOR believes that its economic position has been detrimentally affected as provided in Article 43.3, upon the CONTRACTOR's written
request, the Parties shall meet to agree on any necessary measures or making any
appropriate amendments to the terms of this Contract with a view to re-establishing
the economic equilibrium between the Parties and restoring the CONTRACTOR to
the position it was in prior to the occurrence of the change having such detrimental
effect. Should the Parties be unable to agree on the merit of amending this Contract
and/or on any amendments to be made to this Contract within ninety (90) days of
CONTRACTOR's request (or such other period as may be agreed by the Parties)
the CONTRACTOR may refer the matter in dispute to arbitration as provided in
Article 42.1.
43.5 Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the CONTRACTOR
shall be entitled to request the benefit of any future changes to the petroleum legislation or any other legislation complementing, amending or replacing it.
43.6 The Parties agree to cooperate in all possible ways with a view to fully achieving the objectives of this Contract. The GOVERNMENT shall facilitate the performance of the Petroleum Operations by promptly granting to the
CONTRACTOR any necessary authorization, permit, license or access right and
making available any existing facilities and services with a view to the Parties ob35
taining maximum mutual benefit from the contract.

35. Reproduced in JAMEs BAN4S, SAMPLE GRANTING INSTRUMEN-IS FOR 2007 (2007).
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1. Enforceability of Stabilization Clauses
International arbitral tribunals generally maintain that stabilization clauses are valid and
binding. 36 Balancing the sanctity of sovereignty against the sanctity of contracts, international arbitral tribunals have harmonized the two, reasoning that entry into a contract is
an exercise of sovereignty. Therefore, a State may not invoke the cloak of sovereignty to
disavow earlier commercial contractual commitments.
This situation is illustrated in Texaco v. Libya, 37 relating to Libya's nationalization of
interests in a concession in a purported exercise of sovereignty. The sole arbitrator rejected the notion that the oil concession was an administrative contract subject to Libyan
regulatory powers, and, after considering whether the concession was a binding contract,
38

he found in the affirmative.

The arbitrator then turned to the stabilization clause, which was of the freezing variety,
and provided that:
This Concession shall throughout the period of its validity be construed in accordance with the Petroleum Law and the Regulations in force on the date of execution
of the agreement of amendment by which this paragraph (2) was incorporated into
the concession agreement. Any amendment to or repeal of such Regulations shall not
39
affect the contractual rights of the Company without its Consent.
The arbitrator held that the stabilization clause did not impair Libyan sovereignty, stating,
"Not only has the Libyan State freely undertaken commitments but also the fact that this
clause stabilizes the petroleum legislation and regulations as of the date of the execution of
the agreement does not affect in principle the legislative and regulatory sovereignty of
Libya." 40 He thereby concluded that "nationalization cannot prevail over an internationalized contract, containing stabilization clauses, entered into between a State and a foreign
private company."

41

Further, in AGIP Co. v. Congo,42 arising out of yet another nationalization notwithstanding a stabilization clause, the arbitral tribunal reaffirmed the reasoning in Texaco. It held
that:
These stabilization clauses, freely accepted by the Government, do not affect the
principle of its sovereign legislative and regulatory powers, since it retains both in
relation to those, whether nationals or foreigners, with whom it has not entered into
such obligations, and that, in the present case, changes in the legislative and regulatory arrangements stipulated in the agreement simply cannot be invoked against the
43
other contracting party.
36. See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. & Cal. Asiatic Oil Co. v. Gov't of the Libyan Arab Republic, 17
I.L.M. 1 (Jan. 18, 1977); see also AGIP Co. v. Congo, 21 I.L.M. 726, 735-36 (Nov. 30, 1979).
37. Texaco, 17 I.L.M. at 1.
38. Id. at 10-11.
39. Id. at 24.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 25.
42. AGIP Company v. People's Republic of the Congo, 21 I.L.M. 726 (Nov. 30, 1979).
43. Id. at 735-36.
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In another significant arbitration decision the same year, Government of the State of Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Co. ("Aminoil'), 44 the tribunal reviewed article seventeen

of the parties' 1948 Concession Agreement, which contained the following stabilization
clause:
The Shaikh shall not by general or special legislation or by administrative measures
or by any other act whatever annul this Agreement except as provided in Article 11.
No alteration shall be made in the terms of this Agreement by either the Shaikh or
the Company except in the event of the Shaikh and th[e] Company jointly agreeing
that it is desirable in the interest of both parties to make certain alterations, deletions
45
or additions to this Agreement.
The parties reached a supplemental agreement in 1961, which provided as follows:
If, as a result of changes in the terms of concessions now in existence or as a result of
the result of concessions granted hereafter, an increase in benefits to Governments in
the Middle East should come generally to ...them, the Company shall consult with
the Ruler whether in the light of all relevant circumstances, including the conditions
in which operations are carried out, and taking into account all payments made, any
alterations in the terms of the agreements between the Ruler and the Company
would be equitable to the parties. 46
While article seventeen was a freezing clause, the 1961 supplement was adaptive and
contemplated re-negotiation in the face of changed circumstances. Nonetheless, by Decree Law No. 24 of Sept. 19, 1977, the Kuwaiti government terminated the concession,

ostensibly frustrated because Aminoil would not concede to the government's revised renegotiated terms, resulting in the arbitration proceedings. 47 Kuwait raised a number of
defenses, contending, among others things, that the stabilization clause was invalid be-

cause imposed upon by Britain when it was a British colony; and, even if it was valid, it was
nonetheless annulled by the Kuwait Constitution of 1962, which conferred ownership of
48
all mineral resources on the State.
It further argued that permanent sovereignty over natural resources under international
law prohibited a State from providing a guarantee against the exercise of public authority
over its mineral resources. 49 While the tribunal rejected Kuwait's arguments, it nonetheless noted that stabilization clauses no longer possessed an "absolute character"50 and are
not a bar to nationalization: "The case of nationalisation is certainly not expressly provided against by the [ ]stabilisation clauses of the Concession."si Thus, nationalization
was not inconsistent with stabilization so long the nationalization was not confiscatory in
52
nature and compensation is paid.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil Co., 21 I.L.M. 976 (Sept. 1982).
Id. at 1049.
Id. at 992.
Id. at 998.
Id. at 1021.
Id.
Id. at 1024.
Id. at 1023.
Id. at 1024.
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Accordingly, there is consensus that a sovereign state can enter into binding contractual
agreements with IOCs, thereby reducing their political risk. Nonetheless, this consensus
should not lead to a hasty conclusion that a stabilization clause is inherently valid and
enforceable. First, it must be noted that "no published international arbitration awards
have dealt with" the modern hybrid stabilization clause. 53 Second, the earlier line of arbitral rulings related to expropriations under traditional stabilization rubric rather than
"lesser forms of regulatory change;" 5 4 third, inquiry is still required to determine the legality of the stabilization under local law,55 and whether the host government had proper
authority to enter into the agreement. 56 Fourth, and significantly, international arbitral
decisions validating stability clauses relied on an anchor that conferred jurisdiction in international arbitration, such as international governing law or an investment treaty. An
IOC should, therefore, ensure that it stipulates international law as the governing law,
stipulate for venue outside the host nation, and secure protection under an investment
treaty, where the governing law will be international law.
2.

EnsuringFunctional Utility of Stabilization Clauses

While traditional stabilization clauses have been deemed enforceable under a line of
expropriation cases, as noted above, the modern adaptive clauses have yet to be tested.
Meanwhile, a review of the modern clauses reveals the following potential weaknesses
should they be challenged.
First, modern clauses are contracted not with the State itself but with a State entity,
such as the NOC. One commentator observes that negotiating the stabilization clause
with the NOC is "not in practice a complicating factor and may make it easier to reach an
agreement[,]" 5 7 and concludes that from a judgment recovery perspective, "the NOC as
signatory to the contract might improve the likelihood of the IOC obtaining specific performance and not just lump sum damages from a tribunal."5 8 It is unclear how widespread
this view is shared, but it is not uncommon for production sharing and ancillary agreements to be executed by a State entity only, ostensibly because as the commentator noted
above, it is "easier." 59 A better explanation why a State entity only, the NOC, executes the
production sharing agreement with IOCs is likely dependent on how the applicable upstream petroleum regime is set up (i.e., the upstream petroleum regime provides for the
NOC to receive a license from the host county and for the NOC then to contract with
IOCs).
While proceeding against an NOC could affect specific performance as posited above,
it is submitted that the specter of a binding international arbitral ruling against the State
itself, in addition to the NOC, coupled with the adverse publicity, reputation, and impact
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See Bishop, supra note 4, at 2-25.
See Cotula, supra note 9, at 164.
Id.
See Waelde & Ndi, supra note 2, at 242.
PETER D. CAMERON, ASSOCIATIoN OF INTERNATIONAL

PETROLEUM NEGOTIATORS, STABILIZATION
IN INVESTMENT CoNTRACTs AND CHANGE OF RULES IN HOST COUNTRIES: TOOLS FOR OIL AND GAS

INVESTORS 17 (2006), http:/Aba.legis.state.ak.us/sga/doc-og/2006-07-05-aipn-stabilization-cameronfinal.
pdf.
58. Id. at 18.
59. Id. at 17.
VOL. 42, NO. 4
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on foreign investments, could be more effective in ensuring compliance with contract
terms. Also, when the dispute centers on broader regulatory issues that could nonetheless
impinge on the fiscal regime or radically alter the base agreement, such as tax or environmental regulations, an arbitral ruling against the State likely binds State entities who
would not be party to a limited action against a State entity, such as a NOC.
In addition, to the extent that NOCs or other State entities take their orders from the
State, it is doubtful that an adverse ruling will catalyze specific performance. Moreover,
even after prevailing against the State entity, such as a NOC, an IOC may still have to
bring an action against the State. Further, the State entity is unlikely to have deeper
pockets or attachable assets more than the State.
Finally, the import of negotiating a stabilization clause, it must be recalled, is precisely
to maintain economic balance and to keep IOCs whole should a government enact new
laws or regulations inconsistent with the terms of the contract. Contracting with the State
entity adds to the mix questions of agency, that is, whether the State entity was acting at
the behest of the State, as well as whether the State entity is an alter ego and thereby
acting in the capacity of the government, especially when the State entity has quasi-regulatory functions. Accordingly, to the extent practical, IOCs should endeavor to make the
State a party to the agreement for the limited purpose of stabilization, thereby restraining
the exercise of sovereign power and providing basis for a contract claim against the State
in seeking to be made whole. Without adding the State to the agreement, the IOC faces
the following two uncertainties in proceeding solely against the State entity.
First, unlike an action against the State, assuming requisite jurisdictional basis, arbitral
decisions in actions against a State entity, such as a NOC, mainly in expropriation and
creeping expropriation cases, have been a mixed bag. Commentators and arbitral panels
have advanced different theories for imputing the actions of the NOC to the State under
commercial international arbitration, such as the principles of "piercing the corporate
veil." They have outlined four methods for holding the State responsible: (1) estoppel,
(2) functional identity with the state, (3) evasion of obligations, and (4) responsibility for
60
acts of public authorities.
Under the first theory, estoppel, the "entity is considered to represent the state if 'it
appears from the practice of the States concerned or from other circumstances that their
intention was to consider that person [or entity] as representing the state for such purposes and to dispense with full power."' 61 Under the second theory, functional identity,
the "state is responsible for the acts of the state enterprise if the state enterprise is performing functions exclusively reserved to the state." 62 Under the third theory, "evasion of
obligations or abuse of rights," the inquiry is whether "the state uses the form of... [the]
entity... to evade its own obligations;" while the fourth theory, "responsibility for acts of
public authorities," considers "whether [the] state entity can avoid performance under the
doctrine of force majeure ...[for] acts taken by the state such as administrative acts and
laws." 63 Distilled to its essence, the foregoing four-prong test essentially revolves around
60. R. Doak Bishop, Sashe D. Dimitroff & Craig S. Miles, Strategic Options Available When Catastrophe
LJ.635, 679 (2001).
Strikes theMajor InternationalEnergy Prject, 36 TEx. LNr'xT
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.

WINTER 2008

1328

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

identity and control: whether the state entity is identified with, controlled by, and acts on
behalf of the State.
Focusing on control, the arbitral tribunal in Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain applied a twopart test in determining whether an entity was a State organ whose actions were imputable
to the State: structural control and functional control. 64 Under the structural test, the
Court evaluated the structure of the entity and whether it appeared distinct from the
State, while the functional test was used to examine the functional status of the entity to
determine if it was entrusted with governmental functions and to determine which acts
could be attributed to the State. 65 Accordingly, the presumption that the State entities
have separate juridical existence can be maintained only if the same legislative or administrative measures apply indiscriminately to them as to private entities.
Second, there is hardly a uniform, gold standard for determining when to attribute the
acts of a State entity to the State as arbitral decisions remain inconsistent, are not binding
precedent, and are at best persuasive evidence. 66 Therefore, depending on the circumstances, there remains the risk that the actions of a State entity may not be attributed to
the State, as illustrated below. Where a separately incorporated and juridictionally distinct NOC is tasked with commercial functions while another State agency has regulatory
oversight, arguing that the NOC is an agent of the host government may not win the day.
The foregoing risks are attenuated when the State itself is a party to the agreement, for
the limited purpose of stabilization.
3. Divergent Decisions of Arbitral Panels on Attributing Actions of State Entities to the
States
The following cases highlight the divergent views of arbitral tribunals in determining
whether a state entity's actions under a contract can be imputed to the state itself, albeit in
the context of bilateral investment treaty (BIT) disputes.
In Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, a dispute arising out of the Netherlands-Poland
BIT, one of the issues raised was whether the Polish State Treasury, a State entity,
breached the BIT by privatizing Poland's insurance group, PZU.67 The tribunal held in
the affirmative, attributing the agency's action to the State, reasoning that the State
breached the BIT clauses relating to fair and equitable treatment and prohibiting
68
expropriation.
Further, in WintersballA.G. v. Government of Qatar,the tribunal determined that a company wholly owned by the Government of Qatar was the government's agent because the
government appointed the board of directors of the company and was therefore bound to
arbitrate a dispute under the agent's arbitration clause. 69 In Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic
64. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain (Arg. v. Spain), ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 (an. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID
(W. Bank) 396 (2002), 40 I.L.M. 1129, 1137 (2001), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC566 En&caseld=C 163.
65. Id. at 1136-38.
66. Abul F. M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoriaand InternationalContracts: A Challengefor International
CommercialArbitration?, 14 AM. U. INT'L. L. REv. 657, 730 (1999).
67. Eureko B.V. v. Poland (Neth. v. Poland), Partial Award, (Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal ICSID Aug. 19,
2005), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/annulment--judicialreviewjif content.htm.
68. Id.
69. Wintershall A.G. v. Gov't of Qatar, 28 I.L.M. 795, 811-12 (Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal ICSID 1989).
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Republic of Pakistan, a dispute arising from the most favored-nation provision of the ItalyPakistan BIT and involving an independent State entity, Pakistan's Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA),70 the tribunal's examination of the relationship between
WAPDA and Pakistan revealed strict control of the former by the latter: the Pakistani
government appointed WAPDA's Board and could dismiss it at will, service to WAPDA
was deemed service to Pakistan and its employees were deemed civil servants, and Pakistan
further exercised financial control over WAPDA.71 Nonetheless, it reasoned that because
WAPDA was a jurisdictionally-distinct entity, the government of Pakistan, which was not
in privity of contract with Italy, was not liable for WAPDA's contracts:
Given that the Contracts at issue were concluded between the Claimant and
WAPDA, and not between the Claimant and Pakistan; that under the law of Pakistan,
which governs both the Contracts and the status and capacity of WAPDA for the
purposes of the Contracts, WAPDA is a legal entity distinct from the State of Pakistan; and given that Article 9 of the BIT does not cover breaches of contracts concluded by such an entity, it must follow that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction under
the BIT to entertain Impregilo's claims based on alleged breaches of the Contracts.72
Accordingly, a host nation could be expected to argue that the dispute arising from the
PSC or PSA are under a contract to which it is not a party. Making the State a party for
the limited purpose of stabilization renders the argument moot.
4.

Implicationsfor the Practitioner:

a. Communicate Early and Often with the State and/or State Entity
Counsel should endeavor during contract negotiations to ensure that both parties understand the operative drivers and framework to reduce dispute down the road and further
provide evidentiary support should a dispute ensue. Renegotiation, where contemplated
by the stabilization clause, will likely be difficult if the host government has little appreciation of industry norms and of the risks and costs that the IOC incurs, not only in the brief
boom periods but over the life of the project. Accordingly, the IOC should proactively
educate the host country and/or its entity during negotiations and long after, to the extent
practicable, so they appreciate that the fiscal models are competitive within the oil and gas
industry.
b. Client Management
As the clich6 goes, a little knowledge can be dangerous. So is too much knowledge.
IOC contract advisors and savvy managers sometime see little need to consult with counsel as they believe they can read and construe the agreements as well as anyone. Based on
a plain language construction of the stabilization clause and without correlation to the
arbitration clause and governing law; unaware that the governing law is important to the
enforceability of the stabilization provision, they may take misplaced solace in the stabili70. Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Italy v. Pak.), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3 (Apr. 22,
2005), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&aceionVal=show
Doc&docld=DC642_En&caseld=C224.
71. Id. at T 209.
72. Id. at 1 216.
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zation clause when a dispute bubbles. Managing client relationships and "pre-emptive
lawyering" is critical to assure proper understanding of the contract and evaluation of the
IOCs position should a dispute with a State entity arise.
The popularity of stabilization clauses can engender a false sense of security and result
in a failure to realize the IOC's potentially weak position when the host government introduces measures that unilaterally modify the fiscal regime without expropriating. When
a practitioner realizes that the agreement cannot be internationalized-through governing
law or investment treaty protection-it then behooves him or her to educate the client
and manage expectations early, so alternatives are timely explored before positions are
hardened and passions become inflamed, impeding a negotiated resolution. The time to
communicate with the client is not when a dispute has flared up, but early and often.
c.

Bind the State, not Just the State Entity, to the Stabilization Clause

Divergent international arbitral rulings, such as those shown above, underscore the
need to expressly, directly, and unequivocally bind the state, as practical, to the stabilization clause. This necessity is highlighted by SPP (Middle East) Ltd. (H.K.) and Southern
Pacific PropertiesLtd. (H.K.) v. Arab Republic of Egypt,73 where Southern Pacific Properties
Ltd. (SPP), the Egyptian Minister of Tourism, and the Egyptian General Organization for
Tourism and Hotels (EGOTH) executed a "Heads of Agreement" for a tourist village on
the Pyramids Plateau and another one at Ras-EI-Hekma, which was followed by a second
agreement between SPP and EGOTH and to which was appended the Minister of Tourism's signature with the following: "approved, agreed and ratified by the Minister of Tour74
ism, His Excellency, Mr. Ibrahim Naguib on the Twelfth day of December 1974."
SPP initiated ICC arbitration against Egypt and EGOTH after the projects were
scrapped, and the government of Egypt objected to the ICC jurisdiction, defending on
grounds that it was not a party to the later agreement and arguing that the Minister signed
the agreement in his capacity as Chairman of the General Assembly of EGOTH (acting as
shareholder representative, rather than as Minister) or, alternatively, in a supervisory capacity over EGOTH as a public organization under the Ministry of Tourism. 75 The ICC
Tribunal rejected both arguments and affirmed its jurisdiction, reasoning that, "By the
Minister signing not only 'approved' but also 'agreed' (which clearly means the undertaking of an obligation of its own) the Government also became a contractual party to the
December Agreement." 76 On Egypt's application to the Paris Court of Appeal, the award
was set aside, with the court reasoning that the notation "'approved, agreed and ratified'
must be understood in accordance with Egyptian law, which confers supervision of tourist
sites upon the Ministry of Tourism" and account for his intervention "apart from any will
to become a party to the contract." 77 The Cour de Cassation, the French Supreme Court,
78
upheld the court of appeals decision.
A corollary to the foregoing is that an international tribunal is unlikely to be swayed by
contract by implication: for the State to be bound, the intention must be direct and ex73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

SPP (Middle East) Ltd. (H.K.) & S. Pac. Props. Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 22 I.L.M 752 (1983).
Id. at 756-57.
Id. at 765.
Id. at 767,
Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, July 12, 1984, 23 I.L.M 1048, 1056 (Fr.).
See Cour de cassation [highest court of original jurisdiction], Jan. 6, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1004 (Fr.).
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press. Accordingly, where the State seems to assent to a stabilization clause, it must be
clear whether it is doing so in a supervising, regulatory role, essentially taking-no-exception to the parties' contractual relationship, or binding itself as counterparty to the
contract.
An illustrative case is Svenska Petroleum Exploration AB v. Lithuania, an English High
Court decision relating to an ICC arbitration award. 79 Essentially, the case arose out of a
joint venture between a Swedish petroleum company and a previously state-owned Lithuanian petroleum company for oil exploitation in Lithuania and the arbitration provision
contained within the agreement.80 The agreement further provided that "The Government of... Lithuania hereby approves the above agreement and acknowledges itself to be
legally and contractually bound as if the Government were a signatory to the
Agreement."81
When a dispute arose regarding contract performance, the Swedish company included
the Government of Lithuania in its suit, and the latter asserted the defense of sovereign
immunity, claiming that the arbitration clause bound only the two joint venturers. 8 2 The
tribunal disagreed, finding in favor of the claimant, and the English Court agreed with the
tribunal, reasoning that the Government of Lithuania had waived sovereign immunity and
was bound by the arbitration clause.8 3 Contrary to the practice of JOCs contracting solely
with NOCs, Counsel should endeavor to bind the State to the stabilization clause as part
of the effort to internationalize the agreement, thereby avoiding uncertainty over whether
the NOC is an agent of the State and providing basis for a potential claim against the
State.
Review Applicable Arbitration Law

d.

Where governing law is stipulated to be the domestic law of the host country, or arbitration must occur in the host country, counsel should analyze local law to ascertain
whether and how it characterizes arbitration and whether it provides for international
arbitration. Nigeria, for example, adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration by enacting the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Chapter 19 of
the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, which applies to both domestic and international arbitrations, with venue in Nigeria.84 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act provides that arbitration is international if:
i. the parties have, at the time of the agreement, their places of business in different
countries;
ii.

the place of arbitration is different from the place of business of the parties;

iii. the place of performance of a substantial part of the commercial relationship is
different from the places of business of the parties;
79. Svenska Petroleum Exploration A.B. v. Lithuania, [2005] 1 EV~rHC (Comm) 2437, (2006) 1 All E.R.
731 (Eng.).
80. Id.
81. Id. at T 13.
82. Id.at T 27.
83. Id.
at T 31.
84. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, (1990) Cap. 19 § 57 (Nig.).
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iv. the place with which the subject matter of the dispute is most closely connected
is different from the places of business of the parties; or
v. the parties have agreed that any dispute will be treated as an international
85
arbitration.
Under the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, any arbitration that is not international is domestic and must follow the arbitration rules in the First Schedule to the Arbi86
tration and Conciliation Act.
Like Nigeria, Malaysia similarly adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, defining international arbitration as where:
a. one of the parties to an arbitration agreement, at the time of the conclusion of
that agreement, has its place of business in any State other than Malaysia;
b. one of the following is situated in any State other than Malaysia in which the
parties have their places of business:
i. the seat of arbitration if determined in, or pursuant to, an arbitration
agreement;
ii. any place where a substantial part of the obligations of any commercial or
other relationship is to be performed or the place with which the subject-matter
of the dispute is most closely connected; or
c. the parties have expressly agreed that the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement
87
relates to more than one State.

As in the Nigeria rules, any arbitration that is not international is domestic. Under
both nations' arbitration rules, the key determinant of whether arbitration is international
hinges on the parties having a place of business in different countries. One must therefore
review the applicable arbitration regime and local law to determine whether contemplated
arbitration is likely domestic or international (after due consideration of the parties' residence and domicile), where a substantial part of the contract was to be performed, etc.
The implication of the foregoing is that the practitioner should review local law, as
applicable, to determine whether arbitration is local and its attendant implications. If it
provides for potential international arbitration, counsel should endeavor to appreciate
whether it provides the requisite international bridge. Absent such international nexus,
IOC could be unwittingly stuck in domestic arbitration, with domestic governing law and
venue, rife with the risks discussed below.
e.

Seek Waiver of Soverign Immunity

Consistent with the effort to bind the State to the stabilization clause, making it a contracting party as noted above, counsel should seek waiver of sovereign immunity in the
production sharing agreement, if limited to the stabilization clause, to effect enforcement
85. Id.
86. Id. at § 15(1).
87. Arbitration Act, § 2(a)-(c) (2005) (Malay.), http://www.eurasialegalnetwork.com/library/pdfs/nlArbitrationAct2005.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2009).
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and execution. An example of such waiver is contained in the Kurdistan Model Form,
which provides as follows in article 41:
The GOVERNMENT and any Public Company which may be a CONTRACTOR
entity at any time hereby fully and irrevocably waives any claim to immunity for itself
or any of its assets.
This waiver includes any claim to immunity from:
a. any expert determination, mediation, or arbitration proceedings commenced pursuant to article 42 of this Contract;
b. any judicial, administrative or other proceedings to aid the expert determination,
mediation, or arbitration proceedings commenced pursuant to Article 42 of this
Contract;
c. any effort to confirm, enforce or execute any decision, settlement, award, judgment, service of process, execution order or attachment (including pre judgment attachment) that results from an expert determination, mediation, arbitration or any
88
judicial, administrative or other proceedings commenced pursuant to this Contract.
The express waiver likely renders moot future disputes regarding enforcement and execution of an arbitral award against the host country.
f.

Limit Court Interference

Where the NOC insists on domestic governing law and venue during contract negotiations, IOC counsel should consider specifying in the arbitration clause appropriate limits
to local court interference. As noted in the example of Nigeria below, local laws may
allow robust judicial interference, with the resulting temptation of gamesmanship by a
party.
g.

Place of Arbitration

Location is critical not only in real estate but also in arbitration. Counsel should seriously consider the level of confidence in the local courts, the likelihood of entering interim orders in aid of arbitration, the potential for frustrating arbitration, and the
enforcement of any awards.
In fine, counsel should draft with the end in mind, aware of the potential for litigation,
and should consult local and arbitration counsel early to ensure that the stabilization
clause has a desirable anchor for meaningful enforcement, such as international governing
law and venue. If counsel is unable to secure preferred language in the production sharing
agreement, then a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) remains an internationalizing option.
88. See Model Form Production Sharing Contract of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, http:!!
74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:eS2YOxwr54IJ:www.krg.org/grafik/uploaded/KRGModelPSC_20071112_
2008_07_ 17_h I 5m59s45.pdf+%22Production+Sharing+Contract%22+%22Kurdistan+Regional+Government+of+Iraq%22+%22contractor+entitv%22&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=l&gl=us&client=firefox-a (last visited
Feb. 4, 2009).
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Consider a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)

Assuming contracting options are unavailing, counsel should explore options for a BIT
to confer the requisite international jurisdictional nexus. Where no such treaty exists between the IOC's home State and the foreign country, counsel should consider corporate
restructuring and migration to benefit from a BIT, and while they vary widely, generally
offer the following protections: (i) fair and equitable treatment of the investments and an
obligation not to impair investments by protected nationals; (ii) physical security and protection not less than that accorded either to investments of a contracting state's own nationals or to investments of nationals of a third State; (iii) an "umbrella clause" under
which a contracting state agrees to observe any investment obligations with nationals of
another contracting State; (iv) a prohibition on expropriation, except where: (1) the measures are taken in the public interest and under due process of law; (2) the measures are
not discriminatory or contrary to any undertaking by the contracting State; and (3) the
measures are accompanied by just compensation; (v) free transfer of payments relating to
investments; (vi) a most-favored nation provision under which the host State may not treat
a foreigner's investments less favorably than that of an investor from a third State; and (vii)
an agreement that disputes between a Contracting Party and a national of the other Contracting Party are to be resolved by international arbitration, such as ICSID.89
While some countries have protested against a perceived "abuse" of bilateral investment
treaties when companies "forum shop", incorporating in a treaty nation solely to take
advantage of a BIT protection, arbitral tribunals have rejected such claims; accordingly, an
IOC may "forum shop" for investment treaty protection. 90 In Aguas Del Tunari, S.A. v.
Republic of Bolivia,91 for example, the holding of Aguas del Tunari was migrated from the
Bahamas to Luxembourg, whose shares were in turn held by a Netherlands entity, thereby
availing Aguas Del Tunari of the Netherlands-Bolivian BIT, and providing access to the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
The Republic of Bolivia objected to the ICSID Tribunal's exercise of jurisdiction,
claiming that it "never consented to the availability of ICSID jurisdiction for an entity...
with migratory ownership interests" 92 and that a migrated entity was outside the "circle of
beneficiaries" of the Netherlands-Bolivian BIT. 93 The thrust of Bolivia's argument was
that the corporate restructuring created mere shells for the purpose of gaining ICSID
jurisdiction and that Aguas Del Tunari was not a Bolivian entity "controlled directly or
indirectly" by nationals of the Netherlands, as required by the BIT. The tribunal disagreed, reasoning that there is no real distinction between a company that is "controlled
directly or indirectly" by another company and one that is "subject to the direct or indi94
rect control" of another; share ownership sufficed to establish control.
89. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Start
Page.asp?intItemtD=2068 (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
90. Venezuela, for example, railed against oil companies' alleged abuse of its BIT with Netherlands and
announced that it would renegotiate the treaty. See Venezuela to Renegotiate Dutch Investment Treaty, RELFIERS,
April 30, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN3053796020080430.
91. Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No.ARB/02/3 (Oct. 21, 2005), http://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSID/FrontServet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVa=showDoc&docld=DC629-En&caseld=C210.
92. Id. at 196.
93. Id. at 9 199.
94. Id. at 1 312, 317, 323.
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Risks of Domestic Resolution of a Stabilization Dispute

Absent an international nexus, either contractually as described above, or through a

treaty, an IOC is stuck with domestic arbitration with the attendant risks:
A.

LOCAL COURTS COULD FRUSTRATE ARBITRATION

Domestic arbitration in the host country and under domestic law is generally rife with
risk and determines which local courts would exercise supervisory jurisdiction over the
arbitral tribunal, whether local courts would issue an injunction or order remedies in aid
of arbitration, as well as recognize and enforce an award. The risks of a foreign-owned
IOC litigating in a host country become more acute in disputes relating to stabilization
clauses where arbitration may never even take off.
Nothing precludes the State entity and/or the State from challenging the jurisdiction of
the arbitral panel before the local courts and preempting arbitration or filing a declaratory
judgment to challenge the validity of the stabilization clause.
B.

DELAYED JUSTICE, DENIED JUSTICE

Assuming a challenge to the arbitrability of an issue or other court involvement, and
depending on the specific country, the courts could be manipulated and a ruling could be
light years away. Even after an initial judicial decision is rendered, the State could commence appeals, which could also take years to resolve. That the wheels of justice grind
painfully slowly in some countries, frustrating arbitration, was recently highlighted in the
landmark decision by an English High Court in IPCO (Nig.) Ltd. v. Nigerian Nat'l Petroleum Corp., relating to a contract between IPCO and the Nigerian National Petroleum
95
Corporation (NNPC) to design and build a petroleum export terminal in Nigeria.
A dispute arose and was referred to international arbitration in Nigeria, under Nigerian
law, and under supervision of Nigerian courts. 96 IPCO received an award in October
2004 of $152 million and sought an order of enforcement in England. 97 On November
15, 2004, NNPC appealed against the award in Nigerian courts. On November 22, 2004,
IPCO filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection to NNPC's Original Motion. The English
High Court granted an order to IPCO, but adjourned enforcement of the award pending
resolution of the Nigerian appeal. 98 IPCO applied for a variation of the order adjourning
enforcement of the award, and the court agreed, allowing immediate partial enforcement
of the award (approximately $52.5 million) as subsequent developments in Nigeria had
meant that any appeal against the award now lay some five or ten years in the future:
In the light of all this it is apparent that even a decision at first instance on the
Preliminary Objection may now be very many years away. The potential delay involved in any of the possible outcomes of the appeal is five years together with however long it takes for the matter first to be resolved in the Court of Appeal. On a best
95. IPCO (Nig.) Ltd. v. Nigerian Nat'l Petroleum Corp., [2008] EWHC (Comm) 797, 2008 WL 1771454
(appeal taken from Nig.) (U.K.).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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case analysis at the conclusion of that period either Okeke J would deliver her ruling,
assuming she is still available to do so, or Auta J or another judge would proceed to
re-hear the Preliminary Objection de novo. However if the decision of the Court of
Appeal is that AutaJ should hear and determine the merits of the transfer application,
the timescale for achieving resolution at first instance of the Preliminary Objection
might be more than twice five years, since Auta J's decision on the merits of the
transfer application, when reached, would itself be susceptible to two further appeals.
I have of course been dealing only with the timescale for achievement of a ruling at
first instance on the Preliminary Objection. The prospects as to what might occur
after such a determination are equally dismaying. The appeal process might take of
the order of eight to nine years. 99
C.

LOCAL LAW MAY PERMIT UNRESTRAINED JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE

As noted above, there may be no bar under local law for challenging the arbitrability of
a stabilization clause before local courts. The Malaysian Arbitration Act, for example,
provides in section 4.1 that "[any dispute which the parties have agreed to submit to
arbitration under an arbitration agreement may be determined by arbitration UNLESS THE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY."

10 0

What constitutes "pub-

lic policy" appears to be subjective.
A court could reasonably conclude that an agreement that precludes the state from revising its tax or environmental laws or exercising greater control over its natural resources

is contrary to public policy, notwithstanding the potential detriment to the IOC in altering the fiscal regime.
Further, the Nigerian Arbitration Act arguably grants courts broad supervisory authority over arbitration, including the right to intervene, providing as follows:
4 (1) A court before which an action which is the subject of an arbitration agreement is brought shall, if any party so request not later than when submitting his first
statement on the substance of the dispute, order or stay of proceedings and refer the
parties to arbitration.
(2) Where an action referred to in subsection (1) of this section has been brought
before a court, arbitral proceedings may nevertheless be commenced or continued,
and an award may be made by the arbitral tribunal while the matter is pending before
the court.10 '
Compare, however, with section 5 below:
5 (1)

If any party to an arbitration agreement commences any action in any court

with respect to any matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement any party
to the arbitration agreement may, at any time after appearance and before delivering
any pleadings or taking any other steps in the proceedings, apply to the court to stay
the proceedings.
99. Id. at J 51-52.
100. Arbitration Act § 4(1) (Malay.) (emphasis added).
101. Arbitration and Conciliation Act (1990) Cap. 19 § 4(1) (Nig.).
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(2) A court to which an application is made under subsection (1) of this section may,
if it is satisfied(a) that there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement; and
(b) that the applicant was at the time when the action was commenced and still remains ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbi10 2
tration, make an order staying the proceedings.
D.

LOCAL

LAW'S MAY BE

POORLY

DRAFTED, DEVELOPED, OR INCONSISTENT

The above-cited provisions of Nigeria's Arbitration & Conciliation Act show some of
the inconsistencies one may encounter arbitrating a dispute in a host country. Unlike
section four of the Act, section five does not compel referral to arbitration when a matter

subject to an arbitration agreement is brought before the court-the court "may" but is
not required to refer to arbitration.
Furthermore, even if the IOC prevails in the domestic arbitration, the tribunal's ruling
could be set aside by local courts. Section twenty-nine of Nigeria's Arbitration Act, for
example, provides that the court may annul an award if it "contains decisions on matters
which are beyond the scope of submission to arbitration."10 3 Determining whether the
issue was arbitrable in the first place remains a subjective decision for the courts, and
affords a robust opportunity to frustrate arbitration.
Thus, a domestically arbitrated matter could be prone to judicial preemption, as the
State or State entity could raise before local courts thorny issues such as the authority of
the host government to enter into such commitments without the approval of the legislature, whether a previous government could limit the authority of successive governments,
and whether the government properly waived sovereign immunity. Unlike in international arbitration where courts basically stand aside, local laws may allow extensive judicial
review and supervision. In exercising this role, the courts, unrestrained by decisions of
international arbitral tribunals, could frustrate arbitration and may deem the matter
unarbitrable.
In fine, while international arbitral tribunals have affirmed the validity of stabilization
clauses, reasoning that the contracting State waived sovereign immunity, it is unlikely that
local courts in host countries, which are not bound by arbitral decisions, will follow the
same reasoning. While the host nation and NOC will naturally prefer local law, the reality is that in developing nations plagued by weak institutions, the judiciary is hardly impervious to the endemic, corroding corruption. Local laws are emergent and appointed
judges lack the luxury of lifetime appointments. The same outcry against the perceived
greed of IOCs in boom times and which may spur governmental contract repudiation
could also infect judicial reasoning. While international arbitral tribunals such as Amrinoil
rejected arguments that stabilization clauses were negotiated unfairly and were essentially
imposed, such arguments could have some resonance in local courts, which could contend
102. Id. § 5.
103. Id. § 29.
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that it was a contract of adhesion or was reached with an unauthorized representative,
particularly when contracted with a dictator.
With much room for mischief in the local courts, the practitioner should therefore
endeavor contractually to internationalize the arbitration by providing for dispute referral
to an internationally recognized arbitral forum and by providing for international, rather
than domestic governing law and venue. Even if the State itself did not execute the stabilization clause, a tribunal may nonetheless deem the NOC an agent of the state whose acts
are attributable to the state. Also, the practitioner should ensure that a BIT provides the
requisite bridge to international jurisdiction if contractual options are unavailing.
VI.

Conclusion

The popularity and prevalence of stabilization clauses hardly means that they are an
effective prophylactic in an agreement with a host country. While stabilization clauses
have grown in popularity and remain a useful tool for political risk management, the practitioner must not take their efficacy for granted; their effectiveness depends on other contractual provisions, such as governing law, place of arbitration, and availability of
investment treaty protection. Without a properly drafted arbitration clause providing an
international anchor contractually through express approval by the State (in addition to
the State entity, such as an NOC), international governing law and venue, and absent
recourse to a BIT, the utility of a stabilization clause is suspect as the IOC likely becomes
trapped in the maze and nightmare of domestic arbitration and litigation.
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